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BASIC EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
Russell W. Galloway, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
The equal protection clause1 has been called "the single most
important concept in the Constitution for the protection of individual
rights." 2 It protects racial minorities, women, resident aliens, and il-
legitimate children from discriminatory treatment. It places strict
limits on the government's ability to infringe fundamental constitu-
tional rights of all classes pf persons. And it requires that all govern-
ment classifications be rationally related to legitimate purposes.
But how does the equal protection clause work? This article
describes the basic structure of equal protection analysis. Its purpose
is to help law students, lawyers, and judges understand and apply
the diverse strands of Supreme Court law in this complex and con-
troversial field.
The legal analysis developed by the Supreme Court in its effort
to enforce the equal protection clause is summarized in the following
outline:
Equal Protection: Basic Analysis
I. Preliminary questions
A. Does the court have jurisdiction?
B. Is the claim justiciable?
C. Was the harm caused by government action?
II. On the merits: Did the government action violate the equal
protection clause?
A. Applicability: Did the government use a classification?
1. Facial or
2. In effect
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The clause provides, "[Nior [shall any State] deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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B. Compliance: Does a sufficient justification exist to support
the classification?
1. Classifications subject to intensified scrutiny (presump-
tion of unconstitutionality)
a. Suspect classifications
1) Is the classification suspect or semi-suspect, i.e.,
based on race, national origin, ethnicity, resident
alienage, gender, or illegitimacy?
a) Facial or
b) Effect and purpose
2) Is the applicable level of intensified (strict,
intermediate) scrutiny satisfied?
a) Sufficiently strong (compelling, important) in-
terest?
b) Substantially effective means?
c) Necessary means (least onerous alternative)?
b. Fundamental rights
1) Did the government infringe a fundamental right
of the class?
a) Fundamental right?
b) Infringement?
2) Is strict scrutiny satisfied?
a) Does the government classification further a
compelling interest?
1) Compelling interest?
2) Substantially effective means?
b) Is the use of the classification necessary?
c. Other grounds for intensified scrutiny
1) Is there any other basis for intensified scrutiny,
e.g., somewhat suspect class and somewhat fun-
damental right?
2) Is the use of the classification substantially
related to a substantial government interest?
a) Substantial interest?
b) Means substantially related to end?
1) Substantially effective means?
2) Narrowly tailored means?
2. Classifications subject to rationality review (presump-
tion of constitutionality)
a. Valid government interest?
b. Rational means?
III. Remedies
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Let us translate this outline into prose. A claimant seeking re-
dress for an alleged violation of the equal protection clause must ini-
tially meet three preliminary requirements.3 First, the court must
have jurisdiction over the claim. Second, the claim must be justicia-
ble. And third, the conduct giving rise to the claim must be govern-
ment action. Failure to satisfy any of these requirements normally
results in dismissal without reaching the merits of the equal protec-
tion claim.
If the claimant satisfies the preliminary requirements, the court
will proceed to the merits of the claim. On the merits, the analysis
has two components.4 First, one must determine whether the equal
protection clause is applicable. The equal protection clause applies
only to government classifications (i.e., government action imposing a
burden or conferring a benefit on one class of persons to the exclu-
sion of others).5 Government classifications may be "facial" 6 or "in
effect." If the classification appears on the face of a statute, court
decision, or other government action, the equal protection clause ap-
plies. Similarly, if the government action is neutral on its face but
has the effect of distributing burdens or benefits unequally, equal
protection requirements must be satisfied. If no government classifi-
cation is present, the equal protection clause is not applicable, and
the analysis ends.
If, on the other hand, the government has used a classification,
the equal protection clause is applicable, and one must determine
whether the government complied with the requirements of the
clause. Here the analysis is more complex. In general, the equal pro-
tection clause requires that government classifications be supported
by a sufficient justification. Courts rely on a set of tests collectively
labelled "means-end scrutiny" to measure the sufficiency of the justi-
fication. Some classifications are subject to intensified means-end
3. These are standard preliminary requirements that apply throughout constitutional
law.
4. The two-part structure of the analysis is the same for all constitutional limits. In
applying any constitutional restriction on government action, one should ask first, whether the
limit is applicable-i.e., is this the kind of government action that is subject to this limit?-and
second, whether the government complied with the Supreme Court's rules for enforcing the
limit. In short, the analysis on the merits of any constitutional limit focuses on two issues: (1)
applicability and (2) compliance. See Galloway, Basic Constitutional Analysis, 28 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 775 (1988).
5. E.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 59 (1973) (Stewart,
J., concurring) ("The function of the Equal Protection Clause, rather, is simply to measure
the validity of classifications created by state laws.").
6. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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scrutiny, an activist form of judicial review demanding substantial
justification; others are subject to rationality review, a more deferen-
tial form of means-end scrutiny requiring only a rational
justification.8
Thus, in determining whether a government classification is
supported by sufficient justification to satisfy the equal protection
clause, one must determine first what kind of means-end scrutiny is
applicable and second whether that test is met. Intensified scrutiny is
applicable where the classification is suspect (or semi-suspect), or the
government has infringed a fundamental right, or the classification is
somewhat suspect and the interest is somewhat fundamental. Other-
wise rationality review applies.9
If the classification is suspect or semi-suspect, intensified scru-
tiny is applicable, and the government must overcome a presumption
of unconstitutionality by showing that its justification is sufficient to
satisfy the appropriate level of intensified scrutiny. The Court cur-
rently recognizes four kinds of classifications as suspect or semi-sus-
pect: (1) classifications based on race, ethnicity, or national origin;
(2) state classifications based on resident alienage; (3) classifications
based on gender; and (4) classifications based on illegitimacy.10
The test for determining whether one of these suspect or semi-
suspect classifications is present is somewhat different from the test
for determining whether any government classification is present. If
a facially suspect or semi-suspect classification is present, intensified
scrutiny applies. On the other hand, if the government action classi-
fies only by virtue of an adverse impact on one of these groups, ihe
8. See Galloway, Means-End Scrutiny in American Constitutional Law, 21 Loy.
L.A.L. REV. 449 (1988). Means-end scrutiny is an analytical process used to evaluate the
government's justification for conduct that harms individuals. In applying means-end scrutiny,
courts examine the purposes (ends) which government conduct is designed to serve and the
methods (means) chosen to further those purposes. Such scrutiny may focus on three different
topics: (1) the importance of the government's interests; (2) the effectiveness of the govern-
ment's means; and (3) the availability of less onerous alternatives. The least stringent forms of
means-end scrutiny require only that the government's conduct be a rational means to further
some valid interest. The more intensified forms require that the government's conduct be a
substantially effective and necessary means to further some significant, important, or compel-
ling interest.
9. We must decide, first, whether the . . . [government classification] operates to
the disadvantage of some suspect class or impinges upon a fundamental right
explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict
judicial scrutiny. . . . If not, the . . . [classification] must still be examined to
determine whether it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state pur-
pose . . ..
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 17.
10. See infra notes 42-122 and accompanying text.
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action is not a suspect or semi-suspect classification unless it was
undertaken for the purpose of harming members of the protected
class." Government action having an adverse impact on a protected
class but no evil purpose is subject only to rationality review.
Classifications based on race, ethnicity, and national origin are
suspect. 2 Such classifications violate the equal protection clause un-
less the government can satisfy "strict scrutiny" by showing that the
classification is "necessary to further a compelling interest."'
State government classifications disfavoring resident aliens are
suspect and violate the equal protection clause unless the government
can satisfy the same strict scrutiny test applicable to racial classifica-
tions."' However, when States exclude resident aliens from govern-
ment jobs that go to the heart of the democratic process, strict scru-
tiny is not applicable, and the classification is subject only to
rationality review.' 5
Gender- and illegitimacy-based classifications are semi-suspect
and violate the equal protection clause unless the government can
satisfy intermediate scrutiny by showing that the classification is
"substantially related to an important interest."' 6
Intensified scrutiny also applies if the government action in-
fringes a fundamental right of the members of a class. To determine
whether this fundamental rights strand of equal protection law is
applicable, one must determine, first, whether the challenged govern-
ment action affects any fundamental constitutional right.' 7 If the
government action affects such a fundamental right, one must deter-
mine whether the government action substantially infringes that
right. If so, strict scrutiny applies, and the classification violates the
equal protection clause unless the government shows that its conduct
is necessary to further a compelling interest."8
Occasionally, the Supreme Court uses a mildly intensified form
of means-end scrutiny in cases not involving either a suspect or semi-
11. E.g., Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
12. See infra notes 46-75 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
14. The federal government has broad power over resident aliens and may impose re-
strictions on them without being subject to strict scrutiny. E.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67
(1976).
15. See infra notes 80-86.
16. See infra notes 94-120 and accompanying text.
17. Fundamental rights include those rights expressly protected by specific constitutional
provisions (such as free speech) and other rights recognized as fundamental by the Supreme
Court (such as the right to have one's vote counted equally and the right to migrate from one
state to another).
18. See infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
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suspect classification or an infringement of a fundamental right. This
occurs, apparently, when the government (1) uses a classification
that is not technically suspect or semi-suspect but shares some of the
characteristics of those classes and (2) infringes an interest which is
important even though not technically fundamental. In such cases,
the government must show that its classification is substantially re-
lated to a substantial government purpose.19
If intensified scrutiny does not apply, the classification is subject
to rationality review, a relatively mild kind of means-end scrutiny
requiring only that the classification be a rational means for further-
ing a valid government purpose. Occasionally, the Court uses a
nondeferential rational relation test, which requires that the classifi-
caticn be a demonstrably effective means for furthering some actual
valid government interest. ° Usually, however, the Court uses the
deferential rational basis test, which requires only that the classifica-
tion arguably be a rational means for furthering some conceivable
government interest."1 When rationality review applies, the claimant
normally has the burden of proving that the government's classifica-
tion is not a rational means for furthering any valid government
interest.
If the equal protection clause is inapplicable or the applicable
level of means-end scrutiny is satisfied, the analysis ends. If, how-
ever, the equal protection clause is applicable and its requirements
are not met, one must proceed to questions about remedies. Here the
questions concern what kinds of damages are recoverable and what
kinds of injunctions may be issued to prevent further violations of the
clause.
The next section discusses each step of basic equal protection
analysis in more detail.
DISCUSSION
I. PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
Before reaching the merits, equal protection claimants must sat-
isfy the three standard preliminary requirements that apply through-
out constitutional law (i.e., they must show that the government
harmed them enough to create a justiciable claim that is within the
jurisdiction of the court).
19. See infra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 203-09 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
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A. Does the Court Have Jurisdiction?
First, the claimant must show that the court has jurisdiction
over the claim. This requirement sometimes raises issues in the
equal protection context, as when Congress tries to repeal the Su-
preme Court's jurisdiction over busing cases. This article will as-
sume that jurisdiction is present.
B. Is the Claim Justiciable?
Second, to qualify for a decision on the merits, the claim must
involve a justiciable controversy between adverse parties. Jus-
ticiability problems surface repeatedly in equal protection cases.
Standing barriers, for example, have resulted in dismissal of equal
protection claims without reaching the merits.2" Similarly, mootness
has resulted in dismissal of some famous cases.28 This article will not
provide a detailed analysis of justiciability issues.
C. Was the Harm Caused By Government Action?
Third, the equal protection clause, like most other constitutional
limits, applies only to the government." ' Unequal distribution of
benefits and burdens by private parties need not satisfy equal protec-
tion requirements. If a government official imposes the challenged
classification, the government action requirement is met unless the
classification was completely unrelated to the official's government
duties. If a private party imposes the classification, such as a private
owner refusing to sell a house to a minority purchaser, the govern-
ment action requirement is not met unless the government either
compelled the discrimination2" or encouraged it so substantially that
the decision must be attributed to the government." A symbiotic re-
lationship between the government and the private party, in which
22. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (suit challenging discriminatory zoning
law dismissed because plaintiffs lacked standing).
23. E.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (suit challenging law school's af-
firmative action program dismissed as moot because claimant was about to graduate).
24. Indeed, many of the most famous government action cases have involved equal pro-
tection claims. E.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (refusal to serve black
guest at bar in private club is not government action); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967) (private sales and rentals of real estate considered government action because en-
couraged by state initiative); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (seg-
regation of private restaurant in public parking facility is government action); Shelley v. Krae-
mer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (judicial enforcement of restrictive covenant is government action).
25. E.g., Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963) (segregation of private
restaurant required by ordinance is government action).
26. E.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Reitman, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
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the government profits from the private discrimination, may also sat-
isfy the government action requirement, 7 but the status of this rule
is in doubt.
If the claimant does not satisfy the three preliminary require-
ments, the claim should be dismissed without reaching the merits of
the equal protection issues. If the claimant satisfies the preliminary
requirements, one may proceed to evaluate the equal protection
claim on the merits.
II. ON THE MERITS: WAS THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
VIOLATED?
Analysis of equal protection claims on the merits involves the
same two-step inquiry that applies to all constitutional limits. The
threshold question is whether the equal protection clause is applica-
ble (i.e., whether the government action that harmed claimant was
the kind of government action that is subject to the equal protection
clause). If so, the second step is to determine whether the govern-
ment has complied with equal protection requirements.
A. Applicability: Did the Government Use a Classification?
The equal protection clause applies only to government classifi-
cations. This occurs when government action imposes a burden or
confers a benefit on one class of persons to the exclusion of others.
Government classifications may be "facial" or "in effect."
1. Facial Classification: Did the Government Conduct
Classify "On Its Face"?
Facial classifications are subject to the equal protection clause.
For example, if the classification appears on the face of a statute
(i.e., in the express words of the statute), it is subject to equal protec-
tion scrutiny.28 Similarly, a court order based explicitly on racial
grounds involves a facial government classification.
29
27. See Burton, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
28. E.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (statutes explicitly requiring
racial segregation in public schools); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (statute
limiting jury service to "white male persons").
29. E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (child custody order explicitly based on
race of mother's spouse is suspect); cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (court order
enforcing restrictive covenant is government action).
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2. De Facto Classification: Did the Government Conduct
Classify "In Effect"?
Even if the government action is facially neutral, it is subject to
equal protection scrutiny if it has the effect of distributing burdens
and benefits unequally. 30 At this initial stage in the analysis, when
one is determining whether the equal protection clause is applicable
or not, one need not consider whether the government intended to
harm claimant's class."' It is enough that the government action pro-
duced an unequal effect.
If the government action that harmed claimant is not a classifi-
cation, the equal protection clause does not apply and the equal pro-
tection analysis ends. If, on the other hand, the challenged govern-
ment action is a classification, the analysis proceeds to the question
of compliance.
B. Compliance: Is the Government's Justification for Using the
Classification Sufficient To Satisfy the Applicable Level of Means-
End Scrutiny?
If claimant was harmed by a government classification, the
equal protection clause is applicable, and the analysis reaches a cru-
cial turning point. All government classifications are subject to
means-end scrutiny, so it is clear that the classification must satisfy
some version of means-end scrutiny. But different kinds of classifica-
tions are subject to different levels of means-end scrutiny, varying
from strict scrutiny all the way down to rationality review. The law-
yer's task, at this point in the analysis, is to examine the classifica-
tion, characterize it, and then scan the various strands of equal pro-
tection law to determine which test is controlling. 2
30. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (durational residency requirement
has the effect of dividing applicants into two classes); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elecs., 383
U.S. 663 (1966) (poll tax has the effect of dividing potential voters into two classes).
31. Later, when determining whether a nonfacial classification is suspect, effect is not
enough. Instead, to trigger intensified scrutiny, claimant must show discriminatory effect and
purpose. See infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
32. Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 906 n.6 (1986) ("The
logical first question to ask when presented with an equal protection claim, and the one we
usually ask first, is what level of review is appropriate."); United States R.R. Retirement Bd.
v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174 (1980) ("The initial issue . . . is the appropriate standard of
judicial review .... "). This step of the analysis is akin to the characterization step in conflict
of law analysis. There, the lawyer examines the facts, determines whether the claim is based
on tort, contract, or the like, and then applies the choice-of-law rules for the appropriate body
of law. Similarly, in equal protection cases, the lawyer examines the facts, determines what
kind of classification is present, and then applies the legal test specified by the Supreme Court
1989]
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Is this a suspect classification? Does the classification infringe a
fundamental right? Or is this a run-of-the-mill classification subject
only to rationality review? If any arguable bases for intensified scru-
tiny are present, these theories should be analyzed in more detail. If
no basis for intensified scrutiny is present, rationality review should
be applied.
The following sections describe the different kinds of govern-
ment classifications recognized in Supreme Court cases and the
means-end scrutiny test applicable to each.
1. Is Intensified Scrutiny Applicable, and, If So, Is It Met?
The cases in which the Court uses intensified scrutiny in ap-
praising the justification for government classifications fall into three
categories. First, if the classification is suspect or semi-suspect, inten-
sified scrutiny applies." Second, if the classification results in the
infringement of a fundamental right of class members, intensified
scrutiny applies."4 Third, even if the classification is not suspect and
does not infringe any fundamental right, the Court may adopt inten-
sified scrutiny if the classification is somewhat suspect and the inter-
est is somewhat fundamental." If the classification falls into any of
these three categories, the Court will set aside the usual presumption
of constitutionality and require the government to show that its con-
duct has a strong justification.
a. Suspect Classification Strand
If the challenged classification is suspect or semi-suspect, inten-
sified scrutiny is applicable, and the classification violates the equal
protection clause unless it is supported by a sufficiently weighty jus-
tification to satisfy the appropriate version of intensified scrutiny. To
date, the Court has recognized four kinds of classifications as suspect
or semi-suspect: (1) race, ethnicity, and national origin, (2) resident
alienage, (3) gender, and (4) illegitimacy. 6 These four classifications
will be discussed separately in the following four sections.
First, however, one legal requirement applicable to all four cat-
egories needs to be discussed. In each case, the threshold question
that must be answered before applying intensified scrutiny is
for that particular kind of classification.
33. See infra notes 36-122 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 123-90 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 42-122 and accompanying text.
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whether the government action, in fact, involves a suspect or semi-
suspect classification. Obviously, this question is closely related to the
previously discussed question of whether the government action in-
volves a classification that is subject to the equal protection clause."7
But it is not identical, and the difference is critically important.
In order to be deemed a suspect or semi-suspect classification,
the government action must classify on the basis of race, alienage,
gender or illegitimacy on its face or in effect and purpose. To deter-
mine whether a facially suspect classification exists, one looks at the
language used by the government to see whether an explicit classifi-
cation based on race, alienage, gender or illegitimacy is present. If
so, intensified scrutiny is applicable.
Assume, on the other hand, that no facially suspect classification
exists but that the government action discriminates in effect against
racial minorities, resident aliens, women, or illegitimates. Under the
Supreme Court's cases, such de facto discrimination is not a suspect
or semi-suspect classification unless the government had a purpose to
harm members of such groups. 8 In short, non-facial classifications
against these groups do not trigger intensified scrutiny unless they
discriminate in effect and purpose.
This discriminatory-purpose requirement received its classic
statement in Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,"9 where the Court
stated, " 'Discriminatory purpose,' however, implies more than in-
tent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences. . . . It im-
plies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state legislature, selected
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because
of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable
group."'4
0
37. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
38. E.g., Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
39. 442 U.S. at 279.
40. The Arlington Heights case explains the evidentiary requirements for proving dis-
criminatory purpose. The court should analyze the totality of the circumstances to discern
whether a purpose to harm a protected group was present. Proof of adverse impact is a good
starting point, but only if the discriminatory effect is substantial and not readily explainable on
other grounds. The court should then examine the general history of the government entity to
determine whether it has engaged in any other illegal discrimination. Next, the court should
evaluate the historical background of the specific decision, looking for direct or circumstantial
evidence of discriminatory purpose. Direct evidence includes prior statements in public meet-
ings, reports, or minutes, and, if appropriate, trial testimony by the responsible officials, al-
though the Court has cautioned that putting officials on the stand is "usually to be avoided."
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268 n.18. Circumstantial evidence includes evidence that the
challenged decision was a sudden change of policy, involved a departure from the normal
1989]
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Thus, before invoking the suspect classification strand of equal
protection law as a basis for intensified scrutiny, one must be sure
that the challenged government action classified on the basis of race,
alienage, gender, or illegitimacy, either on its face or in effect and
purpose. This is a standard ingredient in each of the four lines of
suspect classification law.'
1) Classifications Based on Race, National Origin, or
Ethnicity
The core purpose of the equal protection clause was to protect
recently emancipated blacks from government discrimination. Thus,
the Court has long held that racial classifications disfavoring blacks
are normally not allowed.4'2 The Court has extended this core re-
striction to classifications disfavoring other racial minorities, ethnic
minorities, and minorities based on national origin.43 Such classifica-
tions are subject to strict scrutiny." They violate the equal protection
clause unless they are necessary to further a compelling government
interest.'
policy used in similar areas, or resulted from a departure from normal procedures. Indeed,
anything about the sequence of events that suggests a purpose to harm the members of a
protected group would be relevant.
Claimant has the initial burden of proving that the desire to burden the protected class
was "a motivating factor." Id. at 266. If claimant fails to carry this burden, the classification is
not suspect, and rationality review applies. However, if claimant proves that a discriminatory
purpose was present, the burden shifts to the government to prove that the discriminatory
effect was entirely the result of factors other than invidious intent (i.e., that the same result
would have occurred even without the discriminatory purpose). If the government fails to carry
this burden, strict scrutiny is applicable. If, on the other hand, the government proves that the
discriminatory effect was the result of other legitimate, racially neutral purposes, rationality
review is applicable unless the claimant can prove that the proffered neutral purposes are mere
pretexts and that the actual purpose was discriminatory.
41. There is one exception. Claimants in school desegregation cases may prevail by
showing recent actions having a discriminatory impact but no discriminatory purpose if the
school district engaged in intentional discrimination before the limitations period. Dayton Bd.
of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979). If, for example, a predicate of pre-Brown de jure
segregation is established, recent de facto discrimination is enough to trigger strict scrutiny.
42. The first case using the equal protection clause to strike down a classification disfa-
voring blacks was Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), which held unconstitu-
tional a statute restricting eligibility for jury service to whites.
43. E.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding that discrimination
against persons of Japanese origin is presumptively unconstitutional).
44. E.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Korematsu,'323 U.S. 214 (1944).
45. A core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all gov-
ernmentally imposed discrimination based on race. . . . Such classifications are
subject to the most exacting scrutiny; to pass constitutional muster, they must be
justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be 'necessary . . . to
EQUAL PROTECTION
a) Did the Government Use a Classification Based on Race,
National Origin, or Ethnicity?
In applying the rule that racial classifications are subject to
strict scrutiny, the first question is whether the government used a
racial classification.' 6 If the government action discriminates on its
face, on the basis of race, intensified scrutiny is applicable. If, on the
other hand, the government action does not involve facial discrimina-
tion, then the Feeney evil purpose test is applicable, and in order to
trigger strict scrutiny, claimant must show that the government ac-
tion discriminates in effect and purpose on the basis of race."7
b) Did the Government Satisfy Strict Scrutiny?
Strict scrutiny applies to all racial classifications,' but the
treatment of "disadvantaging" classifications that harm minorities
and "benign" classifications that benefit minorities are sufficiently
different to merit separate discussion.
(1) Classifications Disfavoring Minorities
Racial classifications harming minorities-so-called dis-
advantaging racial classifications-are subject to the strictest scru-
tiny." Such classifications are subject to a strong presumption of un-
constitutionality. They violate the equal protection clause unless they
are necessary to further a compelling government interest. To justify
such a classification, the government must prove the following: (1) it
has an actual compelling interest, (2) the classification is substan-
tially and demonstrably effective in advancing that interest, and (3)
use of the racial classification is necessary to further that interest
(i.e., the classification is the least onerous alternative available for
furthering the interest). 50
the accomplishment' of their legitimate purpose ....
Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432-33.
46. The term "racial classifications" will be used in this article to denote classifications
based on race, national origin, or ethnicity.
47. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. Government action that discriminates
against a racial group in effect but not in purpose is subject only to rationality review unless
some other basis for intensified scrutiny is applicable.
48. City of Richmond v. H.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
49. See cases cited supra note 44.
50. See cases cited supra note 44.
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(a) Does the Racial Classification Further a Compelling
Government Interest?
To satisfy the first prong of strict scrutiny, the government must
prove that its disadvantaging racial classification furthers a compel-
ling interest. This prong has two components: (a) the government
must have actually intended that its classification further a compel-
ling (very strong) interest, and (b) the classification must be a sub-
stantially effective method for furthering that interest."
(1) Compelling Interest
The government must prove that the racial classification was
adopted to further a compelling government interest. Such an
interest must, of course, be constitutionally permissible." It must
also have been the government's actual purpose for adopting the
classification; courts will not accept speculations of counsel about
conceivable purposes when strict scrutiny is applicable. Finally, the
interest must be very strong. Avoiding a major military catastrophe
is a compelling interest,5 8 but most government interests are not
strong enough to meet this stringent test.
(2) Substantially Effective Means
Even if the government has a compelling purpose, the racial
classification violates the equal protection clause unless the
government can prove that the classification is a substantially
effective method for furthering that interest. If the classification is
not demonstrably effective in achieving the government's purpose,
there is no compelling justification for using the racial classification,
and the government cannot satisfy strict scrutiny.
(b) Is the Racial Classification Necessary to Further the
Compelling Interest?
The final prong of strict scrutiny requires the government to
prove that the racial classification is a necessary means for furthering
the compelling interest." In other words, the racial classification
51. This test is often not clearly articulated in the Court's opinions, but it is an impor-
tant component of strict scrutiny. Cf infra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
52. For example, a purpose to keep the races separate to maintain racial purity would
be constitutionally impermissible and therefore would not qualify as a compelling interest.
53. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
54. The Court usually labels this the "second" prong of strict scrutiny, but it is really
the third component, since the first prong has two components. See Galloway, supra note 8, at
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must be the least onerous alternative available to achieve the govern-
ment's purpose. If any less onerous method is available, the racial
classification is not necessary, and the government must use the less
onerous alternative rather than the racial classification. 5 The gov-
ernment has the burden of proof regarding necessity and must prove
that no less onerous alternative exists.56
Strict scrutiny is always a difficult test to meet, but the Court
applies it with special strictness in dealing with disadvantaging racial
classifications. Even if the government has a rather powerful justifi-
cation that might be sufficient to justify other kinds of government
action that are subject to strict scrutiny,5 7 the Court is very unlikely
to approve a disadvantaging racial classification." Even here, how-
ever, the rule is not tantamount to an absolute ban. In Korematsu v.
United States," for example, 'the Court held that excluding Japanese
persons from the West Coast during World War II did not violate
the equal protection clause because it was justified by overwhelming
military need.
(2) Benign Racial Classifications Disfavoring the White Majority
Racial classifications disfavoring whites are also subject to strict
scrutiny. 60 Protecting whites was certainly not the core purpose of
the equal protection clause. Nor are whites in need of special judicial
protection because they are unable to use the normal political process
to advance their interests.6 Therefore, three Justices-Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun-have concluded that benign racial classifi-
cations should be subject to intermediate rather than strict scrutiny."2
However, five other Justices-Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, Ken-
nedy, and White-believe that strict scrutiny is the controlling test
for benign racial classifications. 8 Justice Stevens does not accept the
450, 454.
55. Another synonym for "necessary" is "narrowly tailored."
56. Confusion exists regarding whether the government must use less onerous alterna-
tives that are not as effective as the challenged classification.
57. For example, content-based infringements of free speech, or interference with free
exercise of religion.
58. This particularly intense version of strict equal protection scrutiny is justified pre-
cisely because the original core purpose of the equal protection clause was to ban government
discrimination against racial minorities.
59. 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944).
60. City of Richmond v. H.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
61. Cf United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
62. E.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Board of Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
63. City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 712.
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strict scrutiny test and would apply a sliding scale version of ration-
ality review." '
Since a majority of the current Justices are apparently commit-
ted to strict scrutiny of benign racial classifications,", defenders of
racially specific affirmative action programs will have to overcome a
strong presumption of unconstitutionality. They will have to prove
that the benign classification furthers a compelling interest"0 and is
narrowly tailored.6"
The Justices agree that the interest in remedying the effects of
past discrimination is sufficiently compelling to support a benign ra-
cial classification.68 The Court has also suggested that achieving an
ethnically diverse student body is sufficient to support a racially spe-
cific special admission program at a graduate school.69 On the other
hand, remedying past societal discrimination and providing minority
role models are not sufficiently important.70
The Justices also agree that the benign racial classification must
be a substantially effective and necessary (narrowly tailored) means
for advancing the government's compelling interest.71 Moreover,
there is substantial agreement regarding the factors that should be
considered in scrutinizing the means. "In determining whether race-
conscious remedies are appropriate, we look to several factors, in-
cluding the necessity of the relief and the efficacy of alternative rem-
edies, the flexibility and duration of the relief, including the availa-
bility of waiver provisions; the relationship of the numerical goals to
the relevant labor market; and the impact of the relief on the rights
64. E.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 313 (1986) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). The classic statement of Stevens' sliding scale rationality review approach is in the
gender classification case Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211-14 (1976) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
65. City of Richmond does not necessarily require the application of strict scrutiny to all
benign racial classifications. Both the City of Richmond and its city council have black majori-
ties. Thus, narrowly construed, the case only held that strict scrutiny applies when the major-
ity advantages itself. Perhaps Justice White will return to his original view that affirmative
action on behalf of minorities is subject to intermediate scrutiny. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 369
(Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, dissenting in part). But that seems unlikely.
66. City of Richmond, 109 S. Ct. at 723-24.
67. Id. at 727-28.
68. E.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166-67 (1987); Local 28 of Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 451 (1986); Wygant, 476 U.S.. 267
(1986).
69. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
70. Wygant, 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
71. Note, however, that a strict least-onerous-alternative requirement is not applicable
to court orders designed to remedy past discrimination. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 187-88.
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of third parties." 2
Thus, for example, the Court upheld the use of race as one
factor in making admissions decisions at University of California
Davis Medical School but rejected a racial quota system as unneces-
sary.7 And the Court upheld a racial quota for promotions in the
Alabama Highway Patrol because it was necessary to overcome de-
fendants' extreme recalcitrance. 4 But the Court struck down a col-
lective bargaining agreement provision requiring out-of-order layoffs
of public school teachers, mainly because it inflicted too much harm
on a narrow group of innocent white teachers. 5
2) Classifications Based on Resident Alienage
Certain classifications that disfavor resident aliens are suspect
and, like racial classifications, are unconstitutional unless the govern-
ment can satisfy strict scrutiny. The strong presumption that alien-
age-based classifications are unconstitutional does not apply, how-
ever, to the federal government or to state classifications excluding
aliens from important political functions involving the exercise of
discretion.
As in the case of racial classifications, the analysis of alienage-
based classifications proceeds in two steps. One must determine first
whether the government has classified on the basis of alienage. If so,
one must next determine what level of means-end scrutiny is appli-
cable and whether that test is satisfied.
a) Did the Government Use a Classification Based on
Resident Alienage?
The first question is whether the government classified on the
basis of resident alienage. Intensified scrutiny of alienage classifica-
tions applies only when the aliens who are harmed have been admit-
ted to resident status by the federal government.76 If the government
action that harmed claimant discriminated on its face against aliens,
intensified scrutiny may be applicable. If, on the other hand, the gov-
72. Id. at 171.
73. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318.
74. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 186.
75. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986). However, the Court has
approved a one-black-for-each-white promotional quota, holding that the impact on white em-
ployees was not as severe as the impact involved in a layoff. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 182.
76. Classifications disfavoring illegal (nonresident) aliens are subject to rationality re-
view. Henceforth, all references to aliens will be limited to resident aliens unless otherwise
specified.
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ernment action did not involve a facial alienage-based classification,
the Feeney evil purpose test is applicable," and, in order to trigger
intensified scrutiny, claimant must show that the government action
discriminated in effect and purpose on the basis of alienage. 8
b) Did the Government Satisfy the Applicable Level of
Means-End Scrutiny?
Unlike other suspect and semi-suspect classifications, alienage-
based classifications are subject to different intensities of means-end
scrutiny. The particular level of scrutiny depends on whether the
classification was imposed by the federal or state government and
whether the classification concerns a political function. The ensuing
discussion focuses first on state alienage classifications. The rules
concerning the federal government are discussed later.
(1) State Alienage Classifications
As a general rule, state classifications disfavoring resident aliens
are suspect and unconstitutional, unless the government can satisfy
strict scrutiny." A major exception, however, is that such classifica-
tions are subject only to rationality review if they exclude aliens from
important political functions. In analyzing state alienage classifica-
tions, the Court normally asks first whether the political function
exception is applicable.
(a) If the Dougall "Political Function" Exception Is
Applicable, the Alienage Classification Satisfies Equal Protection If
It Is Rational
(1) Is the Political Function Exception Applicable?
Beginning in Sugarman v. Dougall,' the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that state alienage classifications are not suspect if
they merely impose citizenship requirements for voting or holding
important government offices involving formulation, execution, or re-
view of broad public policy. This exception is based on the notion
that, while aliens should normally not be disfavored in the distribu-
tion of economic benefits, it is appropriate for States to reserve im-
77. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
78. Government action that discriminates in effect but not purpose against aliens is sub-
ject only to rationality review unless some other basis for intensified scrutiny is applicable.
79. See cases cited infra note 87.
80. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
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portant government positions for citizens.
The Court uses a two-prong test for determining whether the
political function exception applies. "First, the specificity of the clas-
sification will be examined: a classification that is substantially over-
inclusive or underinclusive tends to undercut the government claim
that the classification serves legitimate political ends. . . . Second,
even if the classification is sufficiently tailored, it may be applied in
the particular case only to . . . those officers who . . . 'perform
functions that go to the heart of representative government.' "81
Thus, if confronted with a state classification based on alienage,
the first step is to analyze whether the classification is narrowly tai-
lored to exclude aliens from important government positions. If the
state haphazardly excludes aliens from some unimportant govern-
ment positions while allowing aliens to hold some important posi-
tions, this belies the claim that the state's purpose is to reserve im-
portant government functions for citizens. In such a case, the
political function exception is inapplicable, and the classification is
subject to strict scrutiny.
If, on the other hand, the government action is narrowly tai-
lored, the next question is whether, in the case at hand, the claimant
is excluded from "functions that go to the heart of representative
government, ' '8 2 i.e., "elective or important non-elective executive,
legislative, and judicial positions" involving "formulation, execution,
or review of broad public policy."8" A two-step test is used to answer
this question. First, the exception applies only if the function in-
volves discretionary as opposed to ministerial (clearly defined and
mandatory) conduct."' Second, the exception applies only to elective
or important nonelective government positions.85
If the state's alienage classification is not a narrowly tailored
means for excluding aliens from important government positions in-
volving the exercise of discretion over public policy, then the Dougall
exception is inapplicable, and strict scrutiny must be satisfied. If, on
the other hand, the Dougall exception is applicable, the classification
is subject only to rationality review. 86
81. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 440 (1982).
82. Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647.
83. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 222 (1984).
84. E.g., id. at 225, which holds that notaries public perform only "clerical and ministe-
rial" functions and are therefore not subject to the Dougall exception.
85. E.g., Cabell, 454 U.S. 432 (1982) (deputy probation officers); Ambach v. Norwick,
441 U.S. 68 (1979) (public school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (state
troopers).
86. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 80 ("rational relationship"); Foley, 435 U.S. at 300 ("rational
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(2) Is Rationality Review Satisfied?
State classifications that exclude resident aliens from political
functions violate the equal protection clause only if claimant proves
that the classifications do not rationally further any valid government
interest. The Court normally adopts a strong presumption of consti-
tutionality and applies the deferential rational basis test, holding
such classifications constitutional unless the claimant proves that they
do not even arguably further any conceivable government interest.
(b) If the Dougall "Political Function" Exception Is Not
Applicable, the Alienage Classification Violates Equal Protection
Unless Strict Scrutiny Is Satisfied
The general rule is that state classifications disfavoring resident
aliens are subject to strict scrutiny."7 Thus, if such a classification is
present and the Dougall exception is not applicable, the classification
is unconstitutional unless the government shows that the classifica-
tion is necessary to further a compelling interest.88 In other words,
the government must show that the classification was adopted to fur-
ther some compelling interest, is a substantially effective means to
further that interest, and is necessary (i.e., the least onerous alterna-
tive available to further that interest). In most cases, the government
cannot meet this stringent test, and the alienage classification violates
equal protection. 89
(2) Federal Alienage Classifications
The federal government, in contrast to the states, has broad
relationship").
87. The landmark case on this point is Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
Accord Bernal, 467 U.S. 216 (1984); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). As the Court put it
in Bernal, "As a general matter, a state law that discriminates on the basis of alienage can be
sustained only if it can withstand strict judicial scrutiny. In order to withstand strict scrutiny,
the law must advance a compelling state interest by the least restrictive means available."
Bernal, 467 U.S. at 219.
88. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text for a more detailed discussion of the
components of strict scrutiny as applied to racial classifications. The structure of the analysis is
essentially identical when applied to alienage classifications, although the Court's scrutiny may
not be quite as strict as in race cases.
89. See, e.g., Bernal, 467 U.S. 216 (1984) (ban on aliens' serving as notaries public);
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977) (denial of state scholarships to aliens); Examining Bd.
v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (ban on aliens' serving as civil engineers); Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717 (1973) (ban on aliens' serving as lawyers); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973) (ban on aliens' holding civil service jobs); Graham, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (denial of
welfare benefits to aliens).
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power to impose restrictions on resident aliens. Therefore, federal
classifications disfavoring resident aliens are not suspect; they are
subject to rationality review rather than strict scrutiny. 90
Instead of using the normal deferential rational basis test, how-
ever, the Court applies a hybrid, sliding-scale version of rationality
review for evaluating such classifications. This test focuses first on
the government's ends or interests and, second, on the government's
means.
(a) End Scrutiny
Federal classifications disfavoring resident aliens, like other
classifications subject to rationality review, are unconstitutional un-
less they are related to some legitimate government interest. But the
Court has held that the end scrutiny regarding alienage classifica-
tions must go a step further and focus on whether the government's
interest is one that relates to national immigration policy. In making
this determination, the Court scrutinizes the government's interest in
a nondeferential manner, asking for the government's actual purpose
in adopting the classification, rather than speculating about hypo-
thetical purposes that might have motivated the classification.91
(b) Means Scrutiny
The Court appears to use a two-tier test for evaluating whether
federal alienage classifications are sufficiently effective to withstand
rationality review. If the Court determines that the classification was
intended to serve some national interest relating to immigration pol-
icy, then it applies a deferential version of rationality review regard-
ing the means. In other words, the Court upholds such classifications
if they are arguably effective methods for furthering national inter-
ests. 2 If, on the other hand, the Court determines that the classifica-
tion was not intended to serve a purpose related to national immigra-
tion policy, then it applies a nondeferential version of rationality
review regarding the means. In other words, it insists on an actual
demonstration that the classification is effective in achieving its
purpose. 93
90. E.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (exclusion of aliens from
civil service jobs); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (restriction on eligibility of aliens for
Medicare benefits).
91. E.g., Hampton, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Mathews, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)
92. E.g., Hampton, 426 U.S. 88 (1976); Mathews, 426 U.S. 67 (1976)
93. E.g., Hampton, 426 U.S. at 115-16.
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3) Classifications Based on Gender
Since the 1970's, the Supreme Court has held that classifica-
tions based on gender are semi-suspect and violate the equal protec-
tion clause unless they satisfy intermediate means-end scrutiny (i.e.,
unless they are substantially related to an important government in-
terest).94 As in the case of racial and alienage classifications, the
analysis of gender-based classifications proceeds in two steps. First,
there must be a determination of whether the government has classi-
fied on the basis of gender. If so, the next step is to ascertain whether
intermediate scrutiny is met.
a) Did the Government Use a Classification Based on
Gender?
In applying the rule that gender-based classifications are subject
to intensified scrutiny, the first question is whether the government
used a gender-based classification. If the government action discrimi-
nates, on its face, on the basis of gender, intensified scrutiny is appli-
cable. If, on the other hand, the government action does not involve
facial gender-based discrimination, then the Feeney evil purpose test
applies, and in order to trigger intensified scrutiny, the claimant
must show that the government action discriminates in effect and
purpose on the basis of gender.95
b) Did the Government Satisfy Intermediate Scrutiny?
Classifications based on gender are subject to intermediate scru-
tiny.96 Such classifications are subject to an intermediate presump-
tion of unconstitutionality. They violate the equal protection clause
unless they are substantially related to an important government in-
terest. 97 "Substantially related" means both substantially effective
and necessary.
In short, to justify a gender-based classification, the government
94. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); cf. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718 (1982).
95. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. Government action that discriminates
against males or females in effect but not in purpose is subject only to rationality review unless
some other basis for intensified scrutiny is present.
96. This is true whether the classification disfavors women or men.
97. E.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. 718 (1982); Craig, 429 U.S. 190
(1976). The initial and classic formulation of the test was in Craig, where the Court said, "To
withstand constitutional challenge, previous cases establish that classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives." Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
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must prove both that it has acted to further an actual important in-
terest and the classification is substantially related to that interest
(i.e., substantially effective and necessary for furthering that inter-
est). This test is not as stringent as strict scrutiny, but it does require
the government to show an "exceedingly persuasive justification.""
(1) Important Government Interest
To satisfy the equal protection clause, the government must
prove that its gender-based classification was adopted to further an
important interest (i.e., a weightier interest than the merely valid
interest required by rationality review, but not necessarily as over-
whelming an interest as needed to satisfy the compelling interest re-
quirement of strict scrutiny). Such an important interest must, of
course, be constitutionally permissible, and it must be the govern-
ment's actual purpose rather than merely a conceivable purpose sug-
gested by a government lawyer or dreamed up by a judge.99 Admin-
istrative convenience is usually not sufficient to satisfy this
requirement. 0" Moreover, purposes that reflect archaic stereotypes
or perpetuate archaic gender-based roles are insufficient."0 Yet the
Court has recognized numerous interests as sufficiently important to
satisfy intermediate scrutiny.10 2
(2) Substantial Relation
To satisfy the equal protection clause, the government must also
prove that its gender-based classification is "substantially related to
achievement of those [important] objectives. 0 ' The substantial rela-
tion test has been called "opaque"' ' and has caused confusion and
dispute, but it now appears to be settled that it requires that the
98. Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724; Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455,
461 (1981); Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979).
99. E.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
100. E.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Craig, 429 U.S.
190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
101. E.g., Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 724-25; Califano v. Webster, 430
U.S. 313 (1977). For example, a government purpose to keep women in homes to raise health-
ier children would be insufficient.
102. Such important interests include: remedying past discrimination, Mississippi Univ.
for Women, 458 U.S. at 718 and Califano, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); traffic safety, Craig, 429 U.S.
190 (1976); helping the needy, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); preparing a
draft of combat troops, Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); preventing illegitimate teen-
age pregnancies, Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981); and protecting reasonable
expectations in retirement funds, Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984).
103. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197.
104. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 474 n.10.
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classification be substantially effective and necessary.
(a) Substantially Effective Means
First, the government must prove that its gender-based classifi-
cation is a substantially effective method for achieving its important
interest.' 0 5 For example, if gender is merely a loosely fitting proxy
for some other relevant trait, the gender-based classification may not
be sufficiently effective to withstand intermediate scrutiny.'0 6 Simi-
larly, if the effect of the classification is actually perverse, the classi-
fication violates equal protection.' 07 Thus, the Court will carefully
scrutinize supposedly remedial classifications to ensure they do not
harm the group they were intended to protect.
(b) Narrowly Tailored Means
After some initial confusion and a few contrary statements,0 8
the Court has apparently decided that the substantial relation test
has a necessity component. For example, the Court struck down the
exclusion of men from a nursing school in part because the "record
in this case is flatly inconsistent with the claim that excluding men
from the School of Nursing is necessary to reach any of MUW's
educational goals."' 0 9 Thus, if a less onerous alternative is available
for furthering the government's important purpose, the gender-based
classification violates equal protection. If, for example, a gender-neu-
tral method, such as holding individual hearings, would accomplish
the task, the government may not use a gender-based
classification.' 10
105. E.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Craig, 429 U.S.
190 (1976); Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). The government has the burden of proof. Several
Justices have suggested that courts should defer to the legislative and executive branches on
this issue, but it is doubtful that this is the majority rule. See, e.g., Rostker, 453 U.S. 57
(1981); Michael M., 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
106. Craig, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
107. In Wengler, 446 U.S. 142 (1980), for example, the classification seemed, at first
glance, to favor women by making them automatically eligible for survivors' benefits. On closer
inspection, however, the classification actually harmed women by making it harder for them to
provide financial security for their survivors, so the Court struck down the classification.
108. E.g., Michael M., 450 U.S. at 473 ("It is argued that this statute is not neces-
sary. . . .The relevant inquiry, however, is not whether the statute is drawn as precisely as it
might have been ....").
109. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982).
110. E.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 281-82 (1979). Some uncertainty remains whether
the less onerous alternative must be "equally effective" in order to invalidate the classification.
E.g., Michael M., 450 U.S. at 473 ("we cannot say that a gender-neutral statute would be as
effective ....").
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4) Classifications Based on Illegitimacy
Similar to classifications based on gender, classifications based
on illegitimacy are semi-suspect and violate the equal protection
clause unless they satisfy intermediate scrutiny,"'1 or unless they are
"substantially related to an important government objective." 11  As
in the case of racial and gender-based classifications, the analysis of
classifications based on illegitimacy proceeds in two steps. The first
step is to determine whether the government has classified on the
basis of illegitimacy. If so, there must be a determination of whether
intermediate scrutiny is satisfied.
a) Did the Government Use a Classification Based on
Illegitimacy?
In applying the rule that classifications disfavoring illegitimates
are subject to intensified scrutiny, the first question is whether the
government used an illegitimacy-based classification. If the govern-
ment action that harmed claimant discriminated, on its face, against
illegitimates, intermediate scrutiny applies. If, however, the govern-
ment action did not involve facial discrimination against illegitimates,
then the Feeney evil purpose test is applicable,118 and in order to
trigger intensified scrutiny, the claimant must show that the govern-
ment action discriminates in effect and purpose on the basis of
illegitimacy.""
111. Clark v. Jeter, 108 S. Ct. 1910, 1914 (1988). The first case suggesting that classifi-
cations disfavoring illegitimates are subject to intensified scrutiny was Levy v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 68 (1968). Intensified scrutiny is appropriate because, historically, illegitimates have been
the victims of discrimination. In addition, illegitimacy is a characteristic for which the individ-
ual is not responsible and which is not relevant to individual fitness. Moreover, discrimination
against illegitimates interferes with fundamental rights concerning family structure and child
rearing.
112. Clark, 108 S. Ct. at 1914. Before Clark, the test for illegitimacy classifications was
"somewhat heightened review" rather than intermediate scrutiny. City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985). Under this test, the classification was
unconstitutional unless it was "substantially related to a legitimate state interest." Mills v.
Hableutzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982) (emphasis added); cf Picket v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 8
(1983). In Clark, the Court raised the level of scrutiny from somewhat heightened scrutiny to
intermediate scrutiny without even mentioning the change. In view of the Court's "zigzag
course" in illegitimacy cases, the new test may not stick. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 678 (11th ed. 1985).
113. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
114. Government action that discriminates against illegitimates in effect but not in pur-
pose is subject only to rationality review unless some other basis for intensified scrutiny is
applicable.
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b) Did the Government Satisfy Intermediate Scrutiny?
Classifications based on illegitimacy are subject to intermediate
scrutiny." 5 Such classifications are subject to a presumption of un-
constitutionality. They violate the equal protection clause unless the
government can prove that they are substantially related to an im-
portant government interest. As in the case of gender-based classifi-
cations, "substantially related" means both substantially effective
and necessary.
In short, to justify a classification based on illegitimacy, the gov-
ernment must prove that the classification is both supported by an
actual important interest and substantially related to that interest
(i.e., substantially effective and necessary for furthering that inter-
est). This test is not as stringent as strict scrutiny, but it is more
stringent than the rational relation basis test used when intensified
scrutiny is not applicable.
(1) Important Government Interest
To satisfy the equal protection clause, the government must
prove that its illegitimacy-based classification was adopted to further
an important government interest. Such an interest must have been
the government's actual purpose rather than merely a conceivable
purpose hypothesized after the fact by an attorney or judge." 6 The
interest in promoting legitimate family relationships is insufficient to
justify imposing sanctions on illegitimate children." 7 On the other
hand, the interest in preventing stale and fraudulent child support
claims is sufficient to satisfy intermediate scrutiny.""
(2) Substantial Relation
To satisfy the equal protection clause, the government must also
prove that its illegitimacy-based classification is substantially related
to its important interest. This requirement has two components.
(a) Substantially Effective Means
First, the government must prove that its illegitimacy-based
classification is a substantially effective method for achieving its im-
115. Clark, 108 S. Ct. 1910 (1988).
116. E.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 776 (1977) ("[W]e will not hypothesize an
additional state purpose .
117. Id. at 762.
118. Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
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portant interest. For example, a statute eliminating illegitimates'
child support rights unless paternity suits are filed within one year
of birth violates equal protection, because it is not "evident that the
passage of twelve months will appreciably increase the likelihood of
fraudulent claims." '119
(b) Narrowly Tailored Means
Second, the government must prove that its illegitimacy-based
classification is necessary. Thus, a one-year statute of limitations on
paternity suits by illegitimates violates equal protection, because as
the Court concluded, "[w]e can conceive of no evidence essential to
paternity claims that invariably will be lost in only one year
"120
In short, government action that discriminates on its face or in
effect and purpose against illegitimates violates equal protection un-
less the government proves that the classification is a substantially
effective and necessary means for furthering an important govern-
ment interest.
To summarize, if the government's classification that harmed
the claimant discriminates on its face or in effect and purpose on the
basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, resident alienage, gender, or
illegitimacy, it violates the equal protection clause unless the appro-
priate level of intensified scrutiny is met. 2 ' To date, the Court has
refused to extend the list of suspect and semi-suspect classifications
beyond these four types.1
22
If no suspect or semi-suspect classification is present, the next
question is whether intensified scrutiny is applicable because the
government's classification infringed a fundamental constitutional
right.
119. Mills, 456 U.S. at 101.
120. Id. The State had no statute of limitations for child support claims by legitimate
children.
121. In a few cases, rationality review is applicable. E.g., federal alienage classifications
and state alienage classifications subject to the political function exception. See supra notes 80-
86, 90-93 and accompanying text.
122. E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (classifica-
tions disfavoring mentally retarded persons are not suspect); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement
v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (classifications disfavoring the elderly are not suspect); James
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (classifications disfavoring the poor are not suspect).
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b. Fundamental Rights Strand
1) In General
Government classifications that infringe fundamental rights of
the members of a class are subject to strict scrutiny. The basic struc-
ture of fundamental rights analysis may be summarized as follows:
Equal Protection/Fundamental Rights; Basic Analysis
1. Applicability: Does the classification infringe a fundamental
right?
a. Fundamental right?
b. Infringement?
2. Compliance: Is strict scrutiny satisfied?
a. Does the classification further a compelling interest?
1) Compelling interest?
2) Substantially effective means?
b. Is the classification necessary?
a) Does the Government Classification Infringe a
Fundamental Right?
(1) Fundamental Right?
If a claimant has been harmed by a government classification
and the lawyer wishes to determine whether the fundamental rights
doctrine is applicable, the lawyer should ask first whether the chal-
lenged government action adversely affects any of the claimant's fun-
damental rights? The test for determining whether a particular right
is fundamental is whether the right is "explicitly or implicitly guar-
anteed by the Constitution."' 23 Freedom of speech, for example, is a
fundamental right, because the first amendment explicitly protects
it. 2 Similarly, the noninterpretive right of privacy is a fundamental
right, because the Court has held that it is protected by the due pro-
123. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
[T]he key to discovering whether education is 'fundamental' is not to be found
in comparisons of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to
subsistence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is
as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether
there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Id.
124. Thus, government classifications infringing the free speech of class members are
subject to strict scrutiny. E.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Police Dep't v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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cess clauses.' And the rights of equal voting weight126 and inter-
state migration 27 are also fundamental because they are implicitly
protected by the Constitution.
(2) Infringement?
If the government action burdens a fundamental right of mem-
bers of the claimant's class, the next question is whether the burden
is sufficiently substantial to be recognized as an infringement. In
general, the totality of the circumstances must be examined from a
common sense point of view and there must be a determination
whether the government's action substantially interferes with the
claimant's exercise of the right. Obviously, a ban on the exercise of
the right backed by threat of legal sanctions is an infringement.' 28
But a lesser interference also qualifies as an infringement if it sub-
stantially deters the exercise of the right or makes the exercise of the
right materially more difficult.' 9
If the government's classification does not infringe a fundamen-
tal right, then one must look to the suspect classification strand or
rationality review for the proper equal protection analysis. If, on the
other hand, the government's action does infringe a fundamental
right of class members, strict scrutiny usually applies.
b) Is Strict Scrutiny Satisfied?
The strict scrutiny test used here is structurally the same as that
used in dealing with racial classifications.'3 The government action
is subject to a strong presumption of unconstitutionality, and the
burden is on the government to prove that the classification is neces-
sary to further a compelling interest.' 8' In other words, the govern-
ment must prove that the classification was designed to serve an ac-
tual legitimate and compelling (very strong) interest, that the
classification is a substantially effective means for furthering that
125. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to choose a marriage part-
ner); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right not to be sterilized).
126. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
127. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
128. E.g., Kramer, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
129. E.g., Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 903 (1986).
130. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
131. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972) ("necessary to promote a com-
pelling governmental interest"); Kramer, 395 U.S. at 627 ("necessary to promote a compelling
state interest").
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purpose, and that no less onerous alternative is, available.
In recent years, the Court has suggested that the fundamental
rights strand of equal protection theory may be redundant and slated
for cancellation. If government action infringes the claimant's funda-
mental right, strict scrutiny should be applicable on that basis alone
without reference to the equal protection clause.182 For example, a
content-based infringement of free speech rights of labor unions trig-
gers strict scrutiny under the first amendment itself, so the equal
protection clause is not needed.183 Similarly, selective interference
with the right of privacy can be curtailed under the due process
clauses without help from equal protection theory.
However, there are at least four lines of fundamental rights
cases that are uniquely associated with the equal protection clause
and which deserve more detailed discussion here: (1) the right of
voters to participate on an equal basis in elections, (2) the right of
political candidates and parties to ballot access, (3) the right of inter-
state migration, and (4) the right of meaningful access to certain ju-
dicial proceedings. The next four sections discuss these topics.
2) The Right to Equal Voting Weight
In a long series of cases beginning with Reynolds v. Sims,"" the
Supreme Court has held that there is a fundamental right to have
one's vote counted equally when the government adopts elections as
the method for choosing officials.185 This fundamental right appears
to be grounded on the equal protection clause itself, on the policy
that the right to an equal vote is "preservative of all rights,"1 ' and
on the judgment that legislators cannot be trusted to correct abuses
132. E.g., Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904-05 n.4 ("Of course, regardless of the label we
place on our analysis-right to migrate or equal protection-once we find a burden on the
right to migrate the standard is the same.").
133. E.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring); cf. Sha-
piro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 659 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
134. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
135. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 336 ("this Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitu-
tionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis..."); Reynolds, 377 U.S.
533 (1964). The fundamental right here is not a right to vote; it is a right to equal participa-
tion if the government chooses to use elections as the method for selecting officials. E.g., San
Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973) ("the protected right,
implicit in our constitutional system, to participate in state elections on an equal basis with
other qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an elective process for determining who
will represent any segment of the State's population").
136. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elecs., 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) ("'the political
franchise of voting' ... [is] a 'fundamental political right, because preservative of all
rights' ").
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in the very voting process that brought them into office.'"
In short, infringements of the fundamental right to have one's
vote counted equally are, as a general rule, subject to strict scrutiny.
But there are also several exceptions to this general rule involving
infringements that are subject only to rationality review. The follow-
ing sections discuss the general rule and then the exceptions.
a) General Rule: Strict Scrutiny
If none of the exceptions listed in the next section applies, an
infringement of the right to equal voting weight is unconstitutional
unless strict scrutiny is satisfied. 38
The first question is whether the claimant's right to participate
in an election on an equal basis has been infringed. Of course, an
outright denial of the right to vote is an infringement. " Similarly,
postponing the right until one has resided in the area for an ex-
tended period is an infringement. " Conditioning the right on pay-
ment of a poll tax is also an infringement. "1 And diluting the value
of the claimant's vote by means of election districts having unequal
population is an infringement. 2
Such infringements violate the equal protection clause unless
they are "necessary to promote a compelling government interest." '"
In the vast majority of cases, this test has been strict in theory and
fatal in fact, but some infringements have survived strict scrutiny.
For example, the Court has upheld a 50-day durational residency
requirement as necessary to serve the compelling interest in accurate
voter lists," And the Court has approved a restriction on voting in
primaries designed to inhibit raiding by voters from other parties.""
137. See, e.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969) ("The
presumption of constitutionality and the approval given 'rational' classifications in other types
of enactments are based on an assumption that the institutions of state government are struc-
tured so as to represent fairly all of the people. However, when the challenge to the statute is
in effect a challenge of this basic assumption, the assumption can no longer serve as the basis
for presuming constitutionality.").
138. E.g., Dunn, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer, 305 U.S. 621 (1969); Reynolds, 377
U.S. 533 (1964).
139. E.g., Kramer, 305 U.S. 621 (1969).
140. E.g., Dunn, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
141. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elecs., 383 U.S. 663 (1963).
142. E.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
143. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 342 (emphasis in original).
144. Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973); Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973).
145. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
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b) Exceptions: Rationality Review
Not all restrictions on the right to participate equally in elec-
tions are subject to strict scrutiny. The Court has recognized five
exceptions involving restrictions that are subject only to rationality
review. Four of these-restrictions based on citizenship, age, resi-
dence, and criminal conviction-are derived from the language of the
fourteenth amendment.146 The fifth exception involves restrictions on
voting rights in elections concerning special districts that do not exer-
cise "general government power" (i.e., districts that do not make
laws binding on the public or administer traditional government
functions)." '
If one of these exceptions is involved, the restriction on voting
rights is presumed to be constitutional and will be upheld unless the
claimant proves it is not rationally related to any legitimate govern-
ment interest.
3) The Right of Ballot Access
The fundamental rights strand of equal protection law also re-
quires intensified scrutiny of government classifications that substan-
tially infringe the fundamental right of candidates and political par-
ties to be listed on election ballots among the voters' choices. 48 This
hybrid right is based in part on the same reasoning as the right to
equal voting weight'49 and in part on the implied first amendment
freedom of association. 5 ' Infringements of the right of ballot access
are subject to strict scrutiny' 5 ' or perhaps a balancing test with the
thumb on claimant's side of the scales.' 52
146. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 provides that sanctions may be imposed against
States that deny the right to vote to any "inhabitants of such State, being twenty-onei years of
age, and citizens of the United States..., except for participation in . . . crime. ... This
implies that restrictions based on residence, age, citizenship, and criminal conviction are
permitted.
147. Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981); cf Salydr Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin
Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973).
148. The seminal ballot-access case is Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
149. Id.
150. E.g., Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208 (1986); Anderson v. Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780 (1983). In Anderson, for example, the Court relied entirely on the first amend-
ment and expressly stated that the equal protection clause was not a basis for the opinion. 1d.
This appears to be the current trend.
151. See cases cited infra note 167. Dicta in the plurality opinion in Clements v. Fash-
ing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982), purported to limit strict scrutiny to financial burdens, burdens on
new or small political parties, and burdens on independent candidates, but this restriction has
not received majority support.
152. Anderson, 460 U.S. 780 (1983). If Anderson is taken seriously, strict scrutiny may
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On the merits, one must first determine whether the challenged
classification infringed the claimant's right of ballot access.' 5 3 Typi-
cal infringements include filing fees,"" voter petition require-
ments,' 5 5 filing deadlines, 5 ' and exclusion from absentee ballots.' 57
If the government classification imposes only a "de minimis burden"
on ballot access, no infringement is present and rationality review
applies.15
8
If the government substantially infringed the claimant's right of
ballot access, the classification violates the equal protection clause,
according to numerous cases decided in the 1960's and 1970's, unless
the government satisfies strict scrutiny by proving that its conduct is
necessary to further a compelling interest." Strict scrutiny is not as
strict in this context as in some others, however, and many infringe-
ments have survived the Court's review.'0 For example, the Court
has accepted as "compelling" the following interests: avoiding voter
confusion and deception,'' maintaining the stability of the political
system,e' maintaining the integrity of elections, 6 ' and requiring a
preliminary showing of substantial support.'64
Cases in the 1980's suggest that strict scrutiny is being replaced
by a balancing test that requires weighing the harm against the
need. The leading case in this development is Anderson v. Cele-
brezze. 65 More recently, Tashjian v. Republican Party' applied a
mode of analysis that seemed to be a composite of strict scrutiny and
be obsolete in this field. Even before Anderson, there were signs that the Court was not deeply
committed to strict scrutiny in ballot-access cases. In Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972),
and Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974), the Court referred alternatively to strict scrutiny
and rationality review.
153. As usual, one should make a common sense judgment whether the challenged gov-
ernment action made claimant's exercise of the right substantially more difficult.
154. Lubin, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
155. Illinois Bd. of Elecs. v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173 (1979).
156. Anderson, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
157. American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974).
158. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957 (1982); cf. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party,
479 U.S. 189 (1986). In Clements, the plurality upheld restrictions on ballot access for current
office holders, stating, "This sort of insignificant interference with access to the ballot need
only rest on a rational predicate .... " Clements, 457 U.S. at 967.
159. E.g., Illinois Bd. of Elecs., 440 U.S. 173 (1979); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724
(1974); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
160. See cases cited infra notes 161-64.
161. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
162. Storer, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
163. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974).
164. Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986).
165. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
166. 479 U.S. 208 (1986).
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balancing. At present, the correct analysis is uncertain, and one must
watch future developments to be sure what test to use.
4) The Right of Interstate Migration
The right to move from one state and take up residence in an-,
other is also a fundamental right that triggers strict equal protection
scrutiny when infringed.1 67  Although the precise constitutional
source of the right remains unclear, 6 ' the Court has held that this
right of interstate migration is constitutionally grounded and there-
fore fundamental for purposes of equal protection analysis. 69 As
with the rights of equal voting weight and ballot access, the analysis
has two steps. One must determine whether the right has been in-
fringed and, if so, whether strict scrutiny has been satisfied.
a) Infringement of the Right of Interstate Migration
The first question is whether the claimant's right of interstate
migration has been infringed.'" Although earlier cases suggest that
the right in question is the "right to travel, ' 71 later cases explicitly
hold that the right involved in this line of cases is the right to mi-
grate from one state to another (i.e., the right to leave one state and
take up residence in another). 72
The Court has developed a specialized test for determining
whether an infringement of the right of interstate migration has oc-
curred, a test in part similar to and in part different from those used
for other fundamental rights.' 78 Under this test, an infringement
167. E.g., Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 904-05 n.4
(1986) ("Laws which burden that right [to migrate] must be necessary to further a compelling
state interest."); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 262 (1974) ("necessary
to promote a compelling governmental interest"); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638
(1969) ("Since the classification here touches on the fundamental right of interstate movement,
its constitutionality must be judged by the stricter standard of whether it promotes a compel-
ling state interest.").
168. "The textual source of the constitutional right ...of free interstate migration,
though, has proven elusive." Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 902. "We have no occasion to ascribe the
source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision." Shapiro, 394
U.S. at 630.
169. Id. at 634 ("in moving from State to State ... appellees were exercising a consti-
tutional right").
170. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 906 n.6.
171. E.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
172. E.g., Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 902 ("the constitutional right to travel, or, more pre-
cisely, the right of free interstate migration"); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250, 255 (1974) ("right to migrate, 'with intent to settle and abide' ").
173. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 903-04.
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may occur in one of three ways. First, if the government action actu-
ally deters interstate migration, it is an infringement sufficient to
trigger strict scrutiny.' Second, if the primary purpose of the gov-
ernment's action is to deter interstate migration, the action is an in-
fringement. 17  Third, if the action "penalizes" the exercise of the
right of interstate migration' 76 by either temporarily depriving new
residents of a "necessity ' 17 7 or permanently depriving new residents
of a significant benefit, 78 that too is an infringement. 7 '
b) Strict Scrutiny
If the government's classification infringed the claimant's right
of interstate migration, strict scrutiny is applicable, and the govern-
ment must prove that the classification is a necessary and substan-
tially effective means to further a compelling interest. Indeed, the
interstate migration cases provide classic examples of strict scrutiny
in action.
In Shapiro v. Thompson,"" for example, the Court rejected a
series of justifications offered by the government, holding that deter-
ring an influx of new residents and rewarding past contributions by
old residents were not permissible purposes; that preserving fiscal
integrity of the state's welfare system was a valid but not a compel-
ling purpose; that improved budget planning was not the govern-
ment's actual purpose, and, in any case, that denial of welfare bene-
fits to newcomers was not a demonstrably effective means to further
that purpose; and that denial of welfare benefits was not necessary to
prevent welfare fraud.'
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. The concept of a "penalty" for interstate migration was suggested in dictum in
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 n.21 (1969). It was raised to the status of a require-
ment in Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. 250 (1974). It was then demoted to an alternative test for
infringement in Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
177. Memorial Hosp., 415 U.S. at 258-61. Such necessities include vital government
benefits such as welfare benefits, housing, and medical care. Id. at 261; Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969).
178. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 909.
179. If the government classification did not infringe the right of interstate migration,
strict scrutiny does not apply. E.g., Jones v. Helms, 452 U.S. 412 (1981).
180. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). %
181. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986), is another good example of strict scrutiny in
action. There the Court rejected four government purposes on the ground that they were not
the government's actual purposes and the means were not sufficiently effective and necessary.
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5) Meaningful Access to Judicial Proceedings
Perhaps the most obscure line of fundamental rights law in-
volves the right of indigents to have meaningful access to courts to
protect certain legal interests. This right derives from the Griffin-
Douglas line of cases,182 which originally suggested that the govern-
ment must provide indigent criminal defendants with "equal access"
to transcripts, assistance of counsel, and other aids needed to put on
a defense. This right of access was based on both the due process and
equal protection clauses.
In Ross v. Moffitt,'88 the Burger Court cut back on the Griffin-
Douglas rule by holding that the government need not provide equal
access but only meaningful access (i.e., the opportunity for meaning-
ful consideration of indigents' claims). In 1985, the Court suggested
that the constitutional foundation of this right of access is not equal
protection but rather the due process requirement of fundamental
fairness." 4 The government, the Court held, may not have to pro-
vide the procedural protection in the first place, but if it chooses to
adopt the procedure, fundamental fairness requires that indigents be
allowed meaningful access. This reinterpretation may eliminate this
strand of equal protection law, but it is perhaps appropriate to ex-
plain briefly how the equal protection analysis worked.
a) Infringement of the Right of Meaningful Access
The basic concept was that the Constitution confers a funda-
mental right of meaningful access to (1) criminal procedures
designed to permit criminal defendants to challenge criminal prose-
cutions 8' and (2) civil proceedings that affect fundamental rights.'8
The specific constitutional source of this right was never clearly ex-
plained, and as a result it was often labelled a "noninterpretive"
constitutional right,'8 7 like the right of marital privacy. The right
was defined as providing that "indigents have an adequate opportu-
182. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
183. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
184. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); cf Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981)
(due process requires free blood-grouping test for indigent defendant in paternity suit).
185. E.g., Douglas, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
186. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (divorce proceedings). This right does
not include access to civil proceedings not involving fundamental rights. Ortwein v. Schwab,
410 U.S. 656 (1973) (appeals from denials of welfare benefits); United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434 (1973) (bankruptcy proceedings).
187. "Noninterpretive" means that the right is not traceable to the text, history, or
structure of the United States Constitution.
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nity to present their claims fairly within the adversary system." '
To determine whether the right of meaningful access was in-
fringed, it was necessary to evaluate all of the materials available to
the court, and analyze whether a meaningful opportunity for consid-
eration of the claim was possible without additional public assis-
tance. Thus, in Ross, the Court concluded that an indigent's petition
for discretionary Supreme Court review could be meaningfully con-
sidered without providing free assistance of counsel, because the doc-
uments already available-for example, lower court transcripts,
briefs, and opinions-gave the Supreme Court enough information
to make a meaningful decision regarding whether to grant review." 9
In contrast, denial of counsel in a criminal defendant's first appeal as
of right infringes the right of meaningful access, because no prior
appellate briefs and court opinions are available to guide the court,
and assistance of counsel is therefore needed to ensure fair considera-
tion of the appeal.1 90
b) Strict Scrutiny
If failure to provide assistance infringed the indigent's right of
meaningful access, the government has the burden to prove that the
denial was necessary to further a compelling interest. Normally the
government could not meet this test, because the only legitimate pur-
pose-saving money-was not compelling. Thus, if assistance was
needed for meaningful access, the government had to provide it in
most cases.
c. Other Bases for Intensified Scrutiny
The Supreme Court has usually taken the position that the
equal protection clause requires only rationality review unless a sus-
pect or semi-suspect classification is present or the classification in-
fringes a fundamental right. 91 In one important case, 9 ' however,
the Court used intensified scrutiny while explicitly holding that the
classification was not suspect and the right was not fundamental.
The case suggests that there is a third category of equal protection
claims triggering intensified scrutiny.
188. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974).
189. Id.
190. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
191. E.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); San
Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
192. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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Plyler v. Doe19' involved a requirement that children of illegal
aliens pay tuition for attending public schools. By a 5-4 vote, the
Supreme Court held that the requirement violated equal protection.
The Court admitted that undocumented aliens do not comprise a
suspect class."' The Court also admitted that the right to public
education is not a fundamental right. 195 Nevertheless, the Court held
that the tuition requirement violated equal protection, because the
government failed to prove that the classification "furthers some sub-
stantial state interest."' 9' Citing cases involving classifications based
on gender and illegitimacy, the Court applied a presumption of un-
constitutionality and struck the requirement down because the gov-
ernment failed to prove that its classification was a demonstrably and
substantially effective means to further its goals.
Plyler appears to stand for the proposition that intensified scru-
tiny applies when the government classification harms a somewhat
suspect class and infringes a somewhat fundamental right. To trigger
this rule, the claimant must show that the class affected has some
similarities to suspect or semi-suspect classes, that the right affected
is very important, and the disability imposed is very severe. Thus, in
Plyler, the Court was impressed by the fact that exclusion from pub-
lic schools creates drastic disabilities affecting all aspects of the
child's future.
It is unclear how far this rule extends. To date, Plyler has no
progeny. Perhaps it is a constitutional sport that will not produce
offspring. Assuming, however, that Plyler is a valid precedent, the
analysis may be summarized as follows:
Plyler; Basic Analysis
1. Applicability
a. Somewhat suspect class and
b. Infringement of somewhat fundamental right
2. Compliance
a. Substantial government interest and
b. Substantial relation, i.e.,
1) Substantially effective means and
2) Narrowly tailored means
193. Id.
194. Id. at 223.
195. Id. at 221.
196. Id. at 230.
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2. Is Rationality Review Applicable, and, If So, Is It Met?
Government classifications which are not subject to intensified
scrutiny are constitutional under the equal protection clause if they
satisfy rationality review.' 97 Rationality review is the least intense
form of means-end scrutiny, requiring only that the government clas-
sification be a rational method for furthering some legitimate govern-
ment interest.1 98 As in other forms of equal protection analysis, one
must determine, first, whether rationality review is applicable, and,
if so, second, whether the rationality requirement is met.
a. Is Rationality Review Applicable?
As stated above, rationality review is applicable whenever the
claimant has been harmed by a government classification that is not
subject to intensified scrutiny, because it is not suspect or semi-sus-
pect and does not infringe any fundamental or semi-fundamental
right. Thus, if the preliminary requirements are met, because the
government has used a classification, and intensified scrutiny is not
applicable, rationality review is the controlling test.
b. Is Rationality Review Satisfied?
Rationality review is a two-prong means-end scrutiny test re-
quiring that the government's action be a rational means for further-
ing a valid government interest. In most cases, if rationality review
applies, the government action is presumed to be constitutional, and
the claimant has the burden of proving that the classification is not
even an arguably rational method for furthering any conceivable
valid government interest. Occasionally, however, the Court applies
rationality review in a more aggressive manner, striking down the
197. E.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The Court's
decisions establish that rationality review is to be applied only after it is determined that the
classification is not subject to intensified scrutiny. E.g., Attorney General of New York v. Soto-
Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 906 n.6 (1986). Therefore, rationality review comes last in the logical
structure of equal protection analysis. The reader should note, however, that rationality review
is, in one sense, the general rule in equal protection analysis, since it applies to all classifica-
tions that are not subject to intensified scrutiny. In other words, rationality review is the "re-
siduary clause" of equal protection law, applicable to the great majority of government classifi-
cations occurring in the run-of-the-mill socio-economic contexts that comprise the vast majority
of government/individual interactions. As such, it is more important than its position at the
end of the equal protection analysis might suggest, and it is important for the student of equal
protection analysis to understand its central role in most equal protection cases.
198. E.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40 ("the traditional standard of review, which re-
quires only that the State's system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate
state purposes").
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government action unless the record contains evidence showing that
the classification is a demonstrably effective method for furthering
some actual valid interest. The following sections describe these def-
erential and nondeferential versions of rationality review in more
detail.
1) Is the Deferential Rational Basis Test Applicable, and, If
So, Is It Met?
The form of rationality review applicable in most cases is the
deferential rational basis test. This is a two-prong test involving
analysis of the government's ends and means.
a) Any Conceivable Valid Interest?
The component involving end scrutiny requires only that the
government's classification be supported by some conceivable valid
government purpose. If, after analyzing the challenged classification,
the court can hypothesize any legitimate interest that the government
might have been attempting to further, that is sufficient. Proof is not
required that the government officials responsible for the classifica-
tion actually had this purpose in mind when they undertook the
challenged action. It is enough if a rational government official might
have acted for this purpose.
b) Arguably Rational Means?
The component involving means scrutiny requires only that the
government classification be arguably an appropriate method for fur-
thering a valid interest. Proof is not required that the classification is
actually effective. It is enough if a reasonable government official
might have believed that the classification would further the goal.
If the deferential rational basis test is applicable, the govern-
ment action is strongly presumed to be constitutional, and claimant
has the burden to prove that the classification is not even arguably
an effective method for furthering any conceivable government inter-
est. This is the least demanding form of means-end scrutiny. Often
called "minimum rationality review," it is so minimal that it has
been dubbed the "hands off" test. 99 All that is required is any con-
ceivable rational basis for concluding that the classification might be
an effective means for pursuing a legitimate goal.200 Although there
199. See G. GUNTHER, supra note 112, at 472.
200. The classic formulation of the test was in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
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have been a few exceptions, the outcome of deferential rationality
review is virtually a foregone conclusion: government action subject
to this test is almost certainly constitutional. In the words of Profes-
sor Gunther, the test involves "minimal scrutiny in theory and virtu-
ally none in fact."' 1
Despite the fact that the deferential rational basis is usually a
mere formality leading to the foregone conclusion that the govern-
ment action is constitutional, it is nevertheless appropriate for the
lawyer analyzing such an issue to spell out the analysis explicitly.
To do so, one must use a two-step analytical structure. First, one
must identify the government interests that might conceivably sup-
port the challenged classification. Second, for each such interest, one
must articulate why the classification arguably furthers that interest,
or, in the alternative, why no rational legislator could have consid-
ered the classification to be an effective method for implementing
that interest.20 2
2) Is the Nondeferential Rational Relation Test Applicable,
and, If So, Is It Met?
Occasionally, the Court applies rationality review in a some-
what more demanding manner, insisting that, even though intensi-
fied scrutiny is not applicable, a government classification is uncon-
stitutional unless it is a demonstrably effective method for furthering
220 U.S. 61 (1911), in which the Court stated:
When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of
facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. . . .One who assails
the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does
not rest upon any reasonable basis, but is essentially arbitrary.
Id. at 78-79. Cf McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), where Chief Justice Warren's
majority opinion stated,
[Tihe Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide
scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differ-
ently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classifica-
tion rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objec-
tive. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional
power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A
statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may
be conceived to justify it.
Id. at 425-26.
201. Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
202. "When faced with a challenge to a legislative classification under the rational-basis
test, the court should ask, first, what the purposes of the statute are, and, second, whether the
classification is rationally related to achievement of those purposes." United States R.R. Re-
tirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 184 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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some actual valid interest.2 03 In such cases, the Court refuses to spec-
ulate about conceivable valid interests and arguably rational means.
Instead, it requires proof that the government officials responsible for
the conduct actually had some legitimate interest in mind and that
the classification actually furthers that interest.204
The formal structure of nondeferential rationality review is
identical to that of deferential rationality review. Step one involves
identification of government interests served by the classification.
Step two involves analysis of each such interest in order to determine
whether the classification is an effective, non-arbitrary method for
furthering such purpose. The only difference is the intensity of the
Court's scrutiny.
The burden of proof under the nondeferential rational relation
test is unclear. The Cleburne case,205 however, suggests that the bur-
den may be on the government.
The Court has used the nondeferential rational relation test to
strike down government action in a variety of cases.2 06 Nevertheless,
it remains unclear why the Court chooses to apply the nondeferential
rather than the deferential version of rationality review from time to
time. Justice Marshall has suggested three factors that should be
considered in deciding whether to intensify rationality review in a
given case: (1) the invidiousness of the classification (i.e., the identity
of the class of persons adversely affected), 07 (2) the importance of
203. The classic recent example of this type of rationality review is Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), in which the Court struck down a classification
disfavoring developmentally disabled (mentally retarded) persons. Justice Marshall's opinion
in the Cleburne case labelled the test " 'second order' rational-basis review." Id. at 458 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting in part).
204. Professor Gunther labels this type of rationality review "newer equal protection"
and "rationality review with a bite," and he summarizes it as follows:
It would have the Court assess the means in terms of legislative purposes that
have substantial basis in actuality, not merely in conjecture. Moreover, it would
have the Justices gauge the reasonableness of questionable means on the basis of
materials that are offered to the Court, rather than resorting to rationalizations
created by perfunctory judicial hypothesizing.
Gunther, supra note 201, at 21.
205. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
206. E.g., id; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985) (imposition of a
tax on out-of-state insurance companies heavier than on domestic insurance companies does
not satisfy rationality review); United States Dept. Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973)
(denial of food stamps to households composed of unrelated persons does not satisfy rationality
review).
207. For example, in Cleburne, the Court may have intensified its rationality review in
part because the class affected was developmentally disabled persons, a politically powerless
class victimized by a history of discrimination much like that faced by racial minorities.
Cleburne, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
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the interest adversely affected, 0 8 and (3) the nature of the govern-
ment's purpose.209 This appears to be as good a starting point as any
for analyzing when the Court might depart from the usual rule and
use nondeferential rather than deferential rationality review.
If the claimant fails to meet the preliminary requirements, or
the equal protection clause is inapplicable because the government
has not used a classification, or a sufficient justification is present to
satisfy the applicable level of means-end scrutiny, claimant loses, and
there is no need to discuss remedies. If, on the other hand, the pre-
liminary requirements are met, a government classification is pre-
sent, and the applicable means-end test is not met, claimant wins,
and the analysis turns to questions concerning remedies.
III. REMEDIES
2 1 0
A. In General
Courts have the duty to enter orders compensating the victims
of illegal discrimination for their damages, preventing future recur-
rence of the conduct, and eliminating the continuing effects of past
discrimination. To carry out this duty, courts have broad discretion
to impose equitable remedies.2 " .The main limitation is that the rem-
edies must be tailored to the constitutional violation: courts are not
free to impose remedies unrelated to counteracting the discriminatory
conduct found to violate the equal protection clause. 12
B. School Desegregation Cases
Some of the most heated disputes concerning equal protection
remedies have occurred in school desegregation cases. In general, the
Court has confirmed the broad power of the district courts to impose
orders that will not only halt the illegal segregation but also eradi-
208. For example, in Moreno, the Court used rationality review to strike down a gov-
ernment classification cutting off subsistence food supplies (food stamps). Moreno, 413 U.S.
528 (1973).
209. In Moreno, the Court held that the restriction on food stamps was not rational, in
part because it was based on hostility toward "hippies," a government interest that the Court
found improper. Id. at 534.
210. This article will not undertake a full analysis of remedies for equal protection
violations, but a few comments are in order.
211. "Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's equi-
table powers to remedy past wrongs is broad . Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971).
212. E.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974) ("The controlling principle
. . . is that the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitu-
tional violation.").
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cate the continuing effects of past segregation root and branch.2 18
Thus, for example, courts may alter attendance zones, 14 order bus
ing of students,2"' throw out freedom of choice plans,2" and impose
such other orders as are necessary to achieve desegregation "now. "217
Indeed, courts may impose district-wide remedies based on a finding
of illegal segregation within any substantial part of the school
district."1 8
On the other hand, the Court has imposed important restric-
tions on the remedial powers of district courts in school desegrega-
tion cases. For example, courts may not impose inter-district reme-
dies involving school districts which have not been found guilty of de
jure segregation. 19 Similarly, courts may not adjust their desegrega-
tion decrees to counteract the effects of white flight and other devel-
opments not "caused by segregative actions" of school officials.
220
CONCLUSION
Equal protection analysis proceeds in three steps. First, the pre-
liminary requirements (jurisdiction, justiciability, and government
action) must be met. Second, the merits of the equal protection claim
must be considered. The equal protection clause is applicable if the
government action that harmed the claimant is a classification on its
face or in effect.
If a classification is present, the next step is to determine the
appropriate level of scrutiny. If the classification is suspect or semi-
suspect, because it discriminates facially or in effect and purpose on
the basis of race, national origin, ethnicity, resident alienage, gender,
or illegitimacy, intensified scrutiny is applicable, and the government
must satisfy the applicable version of intensified scrutiny. If the clas-
sification infringes a fundamental right, intensified scrutiny is also
applicable, and the government must ordinarily satisfy strict scru-
213. E.g., Swann, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430
(1968).
214. Id. This includes the power to pair non-contiguous school zones and to create ger-
rymandered zones that are not compact.
215. Id.
216. Green, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
217. Id. The Court has long since discarded the "all deliberate speed" formula set forth
in Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
218. Keyes v. School Dist., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
219. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). This is an application of the general
principle that "the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of the constitu-
tional violation." Id. at 744.
220. Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435 (1976).
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tiny. If the government action involves a somewhat suspect classifica-
tion and infringes a somewhat fundamental right, intensified scrutiny
is also applicable. All other classifications are subject to rationality
review and are normally constitutional unless the claimant proves
that they do not arguably serve any legitimate government interest.
If the preliminary requirements are satisfied, the claimant has
been harmed by a government classification, and the applicable level
of means-end scrutiny is not satisfied, then an equal protection viola-
tion has occurred, and questions concerning remedies should be
considered.
If this analytical structure is kept clearly in mind, the chances
for an accurate equal protection analysis may be increased.
APPENDIX
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, it is possible to set
forth the following, more detailed outline of basic equal protection
analysis.
Equal Protection: Basic Analysis
I. Have the preliminary requirements been met?
A. Does the court have jurisdiction?
B. Is the claim justiciable?
C. Was the harm caused by government action?
II. On the merits: Did the government action violate the equal
protection clause?
A. Applicability: Did the government use a classification?
1. Facial or
2. In effect
B. Compliance: Does a sufficient justification exist to support
the classification?
1. Classifications subject to intensified scrutiny (presump-
tion of unconstitutionality)
a. Suspect and semi-suspect classfications
1) Race (or national origin or ethnicity)
a) Racial classification?
(1) Facial or
(2) Effect and purpose
b) Justification: strict scrutiny
(1) Does the classification further a compelling
government interest?
(a) Compelling interest?
(b) Substantially effective means?
(2) Is the. classification necessary?
2) Resident alienage
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a) Classfication that burdens resident aliens?
(1) Facial or
(2) Effect and purpose
b) Justification
(1) Classification by state government
(a) Political function exception
(1) Is the exception applicable?
(a) Specifically tailored?
(b) Function that goes to the heart
of representative government?
(1) Discretionary, not ministe-
rial?
(2) Elective or important non-
elective office?
(2) If yes, rationality review
(a) Valid government interest?
(b) Rational means?
(b) General rule: strict scrutiny
(1) Does the classification further a
compelling government interest?
(a) Compelling interest?
(b) Substantially effective means?
(2) Is the classification necessary?
(2) Classification by federal government; spe-
cialized rationality review.
(a) End scrutiny: valid government interest
(Note: In evaluating the government's
interest, the Court asks whether the
interest is related to national immigra-
tion or foreign relations policy).
(b) Means scrutiny
(1) If the interest is related to na-
tional immigration or foreign rela-
tions policy, deferential means
scrutiny (arguably rational means).
(2) If the interest is not related to
national immigration or foreign
relations policy, nondeferential
means scrutiny (demonstrably ef-
fective means).
3) Gender
a) Gender-based classification?
(1) Facial or
(2) In effect
b) Justification: intermediate scrutiny
(1) Important interest?
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(2) Substantial relation?
(a) Substantially effective means?
(b) Narrowly tailored means?
4) Illegitimacy
a) Illegitimacy-based classification?
(1) Facial or
(2) In effect
b) Justification: intermediate scrutiny
(1) Important government interest?
(2) Substantial relation?
(a) Substantially effective means?
(b) Narrowly tailored means?
b. Classifications affecting fundamental rights
1) In general
a) Infringement of fundamental right?
(1) Fundamental right?
(2) Infringement?
b) Strict scrutiny
(1) Does the classification further a compelling
government interest?
(a) Compelling interest?
(b) Substantially effective means?
(2) Is the classification necessary?
2) Equal voting weight
a) Infringement of right of equal voting weight?
(1) Right of equal voting weight?
(2) Infringement?
b) Justification
(1) General rule: strict scrutiny
(a) Does the classification further a com-
pelling government interest?
(1) Compelling government interest?
(2) Substantially effective means?
(b) Is the classification necessary?
(2) Exceptions: rationality review
(a) Is an exception applicable?
(1) Citizenship?
(2) Age?
(3) Residence?
(4) Criminal conviction?
(5) Special district (not making rules
binding on public or administering
traditional government function)?
(b) If so, rationality review
(1) Valid government interest?
(2) Rational means?
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3) Ballot access
a) Infringement of right of ballot access?
(1) Right of ballot access?
(2) Infringement?
b) Justification
(1) Strict scrutiny
(a) Does the classification further a com-
pelling government interest?
(1) Compelling government interest?
(2) Substantially effective means?
(b) Is the classification necessary?
(2) Balancing test; weigh:
(a) Harm vs.
(b) Need
4) Interstate migration
a) Infringement of right of interstate migration?
(1) Right of interstate migration?
(2) Infringement?
(a) Actual deterrence?
(b) Primary purpose to deter? or
(c) Penalty for interstate migration?
(1) Temporary denial of necessity? or
(2) Permanent denial of significant
benefit?
b) Justification: strict scrutiny
(1) Does the classification further a compelling
government interest?
(a) Compelling government interest?
(b) Substantially effective means?
(2) Is the classification necessary?
5) Access to judicial proceedings
a) Criminal proceedings
(1) Infringement of right of meaningful ac-
cess?
(a) Right of meaningful access?
(b) Infringement (denial of opportunity for
meaningful hearing of claim)?
(2) Strict scrutiny
(a) Does the classification further a com-
pelling government interest?
(1) Compelling government interest?
(2) Substantially effective means?
(b) Is the classification necessary?
b) Civil proceedings
(1) Infringement of fundamental right?
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(a) Does the procedure affect a fundamen-
tal right?
(b) Infringement (denial of opportunity for
meaningful hearing of a claim)?
(2) Strict scrutiny
(a) Does the classification further a com-
pelling government interest?
(1) Compelling government interest?
(2) Substantially effective means?
(b) Is the classification necessary?
c. Somewhat suspect classifications and somewhat fun-
damental rights
1) Applicability?
a) Is the classification somewhat suspect? and
b) Does the government action infringe a some-
what fundamental right?
2) Justification: heightened review
a) Substantial government interest?
b) Substantial relation
(1) Substantially effective means?
(2) Narrowly tailored means?
2. Classifications subject to rationality review
a. Nondeferential rational relation test
1) End scrutiny: actual valid interest?
2) Means scrutiny: demonstrably rational means?
b. Deferential rational basis test
1) End scrutiny: any conceivable valid interest?
2) Means scrutiny: arguably rational means?
III. Remedies
A. In general
B. School desegregation
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